The COVID-19 disease has caused thousands of deaths worldwide and required the rapid and drastic adoption of various protective measures as main resources in the fight to reduce the spread of the disease. In the present study we aimed to identify socio cognitive factors that may influence adherence to protective measures toward COVID-19 in a Spanish sample. This longitudinal study analyzes the predictive value of perceived severity and vulnerability of infection, self-efficacy, direct exposure to the virus, and instrumental focused coping (...) style for adhering to infection protection behaviors during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also tests sex and age differences in these factors and changes over time. A two-wave longitudinal study was conducted in March and April 2020 starting the day after a strict national lockdown was decreed in Spain. A path analysis was used to test direct and indirect effects between vulnerability and the adherence to protective behaviors. Results suggest that individuals' perceived severity and vulnerability to COVID-19 and instrumental coping strategies are related to the use of more protective behaviors. This coping strategy mediates the effect of perceived vulnerability on engaging in protective behaviors, and this effect depends on direct exposure to COVID-19 and perceived self-efficacy moderators. Results suggest that recognizing one's own abilities to engage in instrumental actions may facilitate adherence to protective measures in people who had not been directly exposed to COVID-19. Therefore, adopting instrumental coping strategies to manage an individual's perceived vulnerability to infection may positively impact the adherence to protective behaviors, especially during the onset of an unexpected threat and when there is no prior direct experience with the situation. (shrink)

Introducción: La relación entre la comida y cultura es bastante amplia, por ello, se expone la agenda de investigación en torno al tema, a través de la revisión de artículos indexados publicados entre el 2016 y el 2022. Objetivo: sintetizar la producción académica de los últimos años teniendo en cuenta los temas claves, los países de producción y las corrientes teórico-metodológicas utilizadas en los diseños de investigación. Metodología: Revisión documental integrativa. Conclusiones: La literatura encontrada se presenta a través de seis (...) ejes temáticos grandes: alimentos y medicina, identidad y nación, transmisión de saberes, relaciones G-locales y dimensiones sociales. (shrink)

El articulo analiza experiencias de corporeidad de mujeres excombatientes de las FARC-EP, a partir de una investigación sociocrítica, fenomenológica y feminista, que implementó estrategias dialógicas, participativas, contextualizadas y problematizadoras. Los resultados describen los órdenes discursivos insurgentes en torno a la igualdad, los procesos de socialización que moldean cuerpos militantes y a la vez los controlan desde lo normativo; frente a estos últimos se vislumbran prácticas de fuga que evidencian las tensiones entre el orden insurgente y el de la vida civil. (...) Se concluye que el grupo armado moldea una subjetividad que combina elementos de las construcciones de género del contexto campesino de origen y referentes ideológicos y prácticos del contexto bélico que se esfuerza por configurar cuerpos fuertes y disciplinados. (shrink)

Disasters and public health emergencies raise a variety of ethical dilemmas, often including those that require balancing the best interests of individuals against those of groups or communities. The on-going COVID-19 pandemic provides examples of these ethical conflicts, as do other recent outbreaks. Decisions and actions in this context must address different ethical issues, ranging from those directly related to autonomy, consent, privacy and confidentiality to those related to interventions and technologies, such as efficacy, effectiveness, safety and fair access. This (...) paper aims to identify ethical conflicts with complex resolutions involving aspects related to values, rights and needs of individuals and the collective, and to suggest how such challenges could lead to more positive experiences and outcomes when confronted in future emergencies. (shrink)

¿El conflicto armado ha transformado los roles de la mujer en Colombia? En este artículo se quiere evaluar la diversidad de escenarios y roles que las mujeres adquirieron durante el conflicto armado en Colombia. Para dirigir el rumbo de esta investigación y la posibilidad de evaluar alguno escenarios de posacuerdo, este texto se propone: realizar una consideración epistemológica por parte del feminismo latinoamericano que tenga en cuenta la pluralidad de relatos violentos en Latinoamérica analizar relatos de mujeres partícipes en la (...) guerra que permitan evaluar el rol de la mujer más allá de su simple victimización; examinar la situación de la mujer dentro de los conflictos bélicos colombianos y presentar cómo se diferencia de las situaciones de guerra ocurridas en Europa. Todos estos puntos permiten evaluar cómo la guerra en Colombia ha sido fundamental para contemplar los roles de las mujeres más allá del de víctima, como, por ejemplo, las mujeres activistas que han participado en la reconciliación y el ejercicio de memoria histórica durante el acuerdo de paz y el posacuerdo. Dicho logro promueve un porvenir del feminismo que abre nuevos espacios de acción para la mujer, los cuales, debido a la limitación de este trabajo, quedan aún por explorar. (shrink)

This catalogue essay is based on a series of interviews conducted by the authors with international scholars who were asked to reflect on Guattari's scattered comments concerning animism. Interviewees are: Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (anthropologist, Museu Nacional, Rio de Janeiro), Eric Alliez (philosopher, Paris), Jean Claude Polack (psychoanalyst, Paris), Barbara Glowczewski (anthropologist, Paris), Peter Pál Pelbart (philosopher, São Paolo) Janja Rosangela Araujo (master of Capoeira Angola, and professor, Salvador de Bahia) and Jean Jacques Lebel (artist, Paris). Animism was thought (...) by Guattari in relation to a number of themes and places in excess of religion and ritual but in the context of the shattering of capitalism. (shrink)

Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...) popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. -/- This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady to (...) animal research. These requirements are i) social value, ii) scientific validity, iii) independent review, iv) fair subject selection, v) favorable risk-benefit ratio, vi) informed consent, and vii) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we banned animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits – which would be ethically problematic. (shrink)

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...) generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

David Papineau’s _The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience_ is deep, insightful, refreshingly brisk, and very readable. In it, Papineau argues that sensory experiences are intrinsic and non-relational states of subjects; that they do not essentially involve relations to worldly facts, properties, or other items (though they do happen to correlate with worldly items); and that they do not have truth conditions simply in virtue of their conscious (i.e., phenomenal) features. I am in enthusiastic agreement with the picture as described so far. (...) But Papineau also argues that sensory experiences are in no interesting sense essentially representational and that what is responsible for their truth conditions is their correlations with the environment. Here, I disagree. Indeed, I think Papineau does not follow his arguments to their proper conclusions. For if sensory experiences are intrinsic, non-relational, and only contingently correlated with worldly conditions (as Papineau and I agree they are), then the phenomenal features of sensory states are representational in an important sense: they constitute what we think, perceptually experience, or otherwise entertain, making up how things seem to us from a first-person perspective. Because of this, the truth conditions of perceptual experiences cannot be entirely independent of their phenomenal features. They cannot merely be a matter of environmental correlations. If we follow Papineau’s arguments to their proper conclusions, we end up with a view much closer to a version of representationalism that Papineau dismisses, a view he calls “pure phenomenal intentionalism”. (shrink)

O reconhecimento é um conceito normativo. Ao reconhecermos alguém como portador de determinadas características ou capacidades, reconhecemos seu status normativo e estamos assumindo responsabilidade por tratar este alguém de determinada forma. O não reconhecimento, neste caso, pode significar privação de direitos e marginalização; em uma democracia pode impossibilitar indivíduos ou grupos de desfrutar o ideal igualitário democrático, por exemplo. Nas últimas três décadas, a reflexão sobre esta categoria se aprofundou e assumiu maior importância no debate entre liberalismo e comunitarismo em (...) paralelo às demandas, por vezes pelas conquistas, de grupos e minorias que se sentem não reconhecidos e se engajam em movimentos políticos através de lutas por reconhecimento. Retomaremos, aqui, o desenvolvimento do conceito de “eticidade” empreendido por Axel Honneth em Luta por reconhecimento, obra fundamental para a reflexão sobre o tema. O autor situa sua teoria no meio termo entre a moral kantiana e as éticas comunitaristas: sua concepção é formal por entender que normas universais são condições de algumas possibilidades, mas é substantiva por se orientar pelo fim da autorrealização humana. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.

Over the past few decades, the dominant approach to explaining intentionality has been a naturalistic approach, one appealing only to non-mental ingredients condoned by the natural sciences. Karen Neander’s A Mark of the Mental (2017) is the latest installment in the naturalist project, proposing a detailed and systematic theory of intentionality that combines aspects of several naturalistic approaches, invoking causal relations, teleological functions, and relations of second-order similarity. In this paper, we consider the case of perceptual representations of colors, which (...) is a challenging case for Neander’s theory. This case will brings out a general methodological concern with Neander’s and other naturalistic theories: these theories generally rest on the assumption that the mental intentionality we are acquainted with in everyday life—the phenomenon exhibited by desires for cups of coffee, perceptual experiences of dogs playing in yards, and thoughts about the weather—is the very same kind of phenomenon that cognitive science studies under labels such as “mental representation” and, in some cases, “information processing.” This assumption is dubious, as the case of Neander’s theory illustrates. (shrink)

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the views. This paper clarifies and improves the argument (...) in Mendelovici 2013 and response to Artiga's arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...) about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this article, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states. (shrink)

Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the (...) contents of intentional states. I argue that we should understand the views in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a short discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content. (shrink)

The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis, (...) the hypothesis that we are ignorant of certain key facts about mental combination, which allows the panpsychist to avoid certain objections based on the combination problem. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...) and reflective senses of thoughts and the concepts they involve, but it also applies to other mental instances of intentionality. (shrink)

Moods are sometimes thought to be counter-examples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state’s phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods on which moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties that are not bound to any (...) objects. (shrink)

William Lycan is a notable early proponent of representationalism, which is, roughly, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are nothing over and above its representational features (perhaps in addition to some further ingredients). Representationalism faces a challenge in accounting for perspectival experiences, which are, roughly, experiences that arise from our occupying a particular real or perceived perspective on the world. This paper presents representationalism, situating Lycan's version of representationalism within the representationalist landscape, and describes the challenge from perspectival (...) experiences. It considers three different representationalist treatments of perspectival experiences: the Layered View, which is developed by Lycan; the Relational Properties View, which Lycan eventually comes to endorse; and the Naive View, which, I will argue, combines elements from both views to achieve the best overall view. (shrink)

This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs about the (...) world. This chapter argues that there is no such incompatibility. Since olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent, they can lead to true and justified beliefs about putatively smelly objects. (shrink)

According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue of ascribing (...) them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions. (shrink)

Making data broadly accessible is essential to creating a medical information commons. Transparency about data-sharing practices can cultivate trust among prospective and existing MIC participants. We present an analysis of 34 initiatives sharing DNA-derived data based on public information. We describe data-sharing practices captured, including practices related to consent, privacy and security, data access, oversight, and participant engagement. Our results reveal that data-sharing initiatives have some distance to go in achieving transparency.

Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational (...) features are a matter of our ascribing contents to ourselves or our mental states or contents; and (3) a representationalist picture of the attitudes, on which the attitude components of mental states (e.g., the “belief” bit of a belief that P) are represented contents. This paper outlines and motivates the view of beliefs as self-verifying fictions, compares the view to alternative views of belief, and contrasts beliefs on the resulting picture to other belief-like mental states. (shrink)

Advances in technologies and biomedical informatics have expanded capacity to generate and share biomedical data. With a lens on genomic data, we present a typology characterizing the data-sharing landscape in biomedical research to advance understanding of the key stakeholders and existing data-sharing practices. The typology highlights the diversity of data-sharing efforts and facilitators and reveals how novel data-sharing efforts are challenging existing norms regarding the role of individuals whom the data describe.

En este artículo se señalan algunas condiciones que son necesarias para el desarrollo y estabilidad de la democracia contemporánea, las cuales están vinculadas tanto al problema de la limitación de su poder como al de la justicia social. El texto está estructurado en tres partes: en la primera, se presenta un breve panorama de los niveles de apoyo que tiene la democracia en América Latina, destacando en especial las condiciones de desigualdad que hay en México; en la segunda, se analiza (...) la propuesta de Norberto Bobbio, para quien la democracia se caracteriza por ser representativa, política y formal; en la tercera, se recuperan algunos elementos de uno de sus principales discípulos, Luigi Ferrajoli, quien ha señalado la necesidad de la democracia sustancial y los derechos fundamentales para limitar el poder de la democracia formal. Palabras clave: Democracia; derechos fundamentales; desigualdad social Limits of Democracy and Social JusticeIn this article I point out some necessary conditions for the development and stability of contemporary democracy; conditions which are linked to both, the problem of the limitation of its power and social justice. The text is structured into three parts. In the first I present a brief overview of the levels of support that democracy has in Latin America, focusing especially on the inequality conditions existing in Mexico. In the second part I analyze the proposal of Norberto Bobbio´s, for whom democracy is characterized by being representative, political and formal. In the third part, I recall some points dealt with by one of his disciples, Luigi Ferrajoli, who has pointed to the need for substantial democracy and fundamental rights to limit the power of formal democracy. Keywords: Democracy; fundamental rights; social inequality. (shrink)

We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We (...) argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended and prima facie implausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical analysis of the strategic use of biomedical models of mental illness as a means of challenging stigma. Likening mental illnesses to physical illnesses reinforces notions that persons with mental illnesses are of a fundamentally “different kind,” entrenches misperceptions that they are inherently more violent, and promotes overreliance on diagnostic labeling and pharmaceutical treatments. I conclude that too much has been invested in the claim that the body is somehow morally neutral, and that advocates of this (...) approach oversimplify, misrepresent, and underestimate the personal and social costs of physical illness. (shrink)

The word stigma comes from ancient Greece, and was initially used in reference to signs or symbols physically cut into or burned onto the bodies of those deemed to be of an inferior status. It was a marking of one's tarnished and flawed character. Today, stigma is more often attached to one's social standing, personality traits, or psychological makeup. "People are no longer physically branded; instead they are societally labeled—as poor, as criminal, homosexual, mentally ill, and so on. These labels (...) influence public perceptions and behavior and lead to devaluation and denigration of those who are so labeled" (Wahl 1999, 11–12).The modern usage of the term stigma and contemporary focus on the concept as a topic of .. (shrink)

Hablar de infinitud parecería conducirnos a dimensiones abstractas o lejanas; se trataría entonces de un discurso que pertenecería a lo meramente lógico o insustancial. En este estudio se pretende, por el contrario, hablar de la infinitud como realidad, como aquello en lo que estamos y que nos constituye. Pero no se trata solamente de la realidad divina, tardíamente considerada sin embargo como infinita, sino también de la realidad toda, que procede en definitiva de lo divino infinito como de su fuente (...) y sustento radical, y que debido a ello no puede coherentemente ser pensada sino como participando de algún modo de lo infinito originante. La amplia y sutil peripecia especulativa de la reflexión occidental, desde lo griegos hasta la actualidad, sobre la infinitud o no-limitación de la realidad es aquí objeto de atención y análisis sostenidos. (shrink)